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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 18-1564
___________
MATTHEW JONES,
Appellant
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE;
THE STATE OF DELAWARE; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-17-cv-00995)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 16, 2018
Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 17, 2018)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se Appellant Matthew Jones appeals from the dismissal of his complaint as
frivolous, and because it sought monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (iii).1 For the following reasons, we will
affirm the judgment.
Jones filed a complaint seeking $2 billion in damages against the Attorney General
of Delaware, the State of Delaware, and the Delaware Department of Justice. As the
District Court noted, the complaint is a “rambling, disjointed biography of Jones’ life,” in
which he claims that he was kidnapped by the Delaware State Police at birth, and has
been “imprisoned illegally” since then for “sexual reasons.” He claims that the
defendants have “attempted to murder me and assaulted me,” and are responsible for his
“misdiagnosis [as suffering from schizophrenia] and malicious care.” As a basis for his
action, he lists two criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1035 (“False statements relating to
health care matters”) & 2251 (“Sexual exploitation of children”), and the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise de novo review
over dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), see Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d
Cir. 2003), and over legal determinations regarding immunity, see Dotzel v. Ashbridge,
438 F.3d 320, 324-25 (3d Cir. 2006). A complaint is frivolous where it relies on an
“indisputably meritless legal theory,” such as where the defendants are “immune from
suit.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
We agree with the District Court that Jones’ claims against the defendants are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which protects a state or state agency from suit,
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Jones was granted in forma pauperis (IFP) status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
2

unless Congress has specifically abrogated the state's immunity or the state has waived its
own immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1984); Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25-26 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (concluding that a suit against a state
official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the official's office, and as such is
no different than a suit against the state itself). Because Delaware has not waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the claims against these defendants were subject to
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
We perceive no error in the District Court’s determination that amendment of the
complaint would have been futile, as there are no factual allegations from which we can
infer that Jones could have an actionable claim for relief. See Maiden Creek Assocs. v.
U.S. Dep't of Transp., 823 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that review of a district
court’s futility determination is de novo).
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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